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ABSTRACT 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholarship contends that 
international law privileges nation-states in the Global North over those in the Global 
South. The literature primarily draws on a Westphalian conception of the North-South 
divide in analyzing asymmetrical issues of power in the global political economy. Given 
the expansion of global capitalism, however, the nation-state-based mode of analysis 
misses the fact that there are Global Souths in the geographic North and Global Norths 
in the geographic South. This Essay makes two theoretical claims. 
First, it argues that racial capitalism renders expendable populations across the 
geographic North and South, destabilizing the Westphalian North-South structure. 
Global Southerners, defined by their positionality as capitalism’s externalities, exist 
across the North-South schema. The Essay uses climate displacement as an example. The 
adverse effects of carbon pollution combine with postcolonial legacy and contemporary 
imperialism to transmogrify the lives, livelihoods, and homelands of Black, Indigenous, 
and People of Color (BIPOC) around the world into the hidden cost of industrialization. 
Climate change, an issue that challenges strict notions of national borders, serves as 
germane material in the Essay’s work to deterritorialize the notion of the North-South 
divide. 
Second, this Essay names the existence of Global Southerners in the geographic 
North as a heretofore unnamed site of resistance for reordering the North-South divide 
in international law. It leverages the author’s deterritorialized view of the Global South 
to claim that Global Southerners are political agents with the capacity to shift the global 
political economy of international law. Although others have begun to reimagine the 
Global South beyond geographical lines in order to articulate a theory of resistance in 
international law, this Essay seeks to break new ground by highlighting the particular 
power of Global Southerners residing in the geographic North. As such, this Essay 
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INTRODUCTION 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) posits that international 
law unevenly structures power dynamics between nation-states.1 Rather than serving as 
a neutral generator and arbiter of legal rules and norms, international law produces 
winners and losers. The winners are industrialized nation-states following the colonial 
period: the Global North.2 The losers are developing nation-states that were formerly 
colonized: the Global South.3 Climate change law serves as a seemingly paradigmatic 
example within this North-South apparatus. The United States, the European Union, and 
other top emitters remain responsible for 41.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions,4 
while climate-vulnerable states have been largely unable to leverage the United Nations 
 
 1. Sumudu Atapattu & Carmen G. Gonzalez, The North-South Divide in International Environmental 
Law: Framing the Issues, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1, 12–13 
(Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2015) (arguing that TWAIL scholarship examines the colonial underpinnings of 
international law and critiques contemporary international law’s perpetuation of “Northern hegemony”); see also 
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78–79, 90–92 
(2004) (claiming that colonialism was central to the development of international law by pointing to doctrines 
such as terra nullius and state recognition). 
 2. See M. Rafiqul Islam, History of the North-South Divide in International Law: Colonial Discourses, 
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH, supra 
note 1, at 23, 43–47; see also E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509,      
1535–36 (2019) (referring to the “colonial advantage” that European nation-states enjoyed over their colonies 
due to international legal doctrines such as sovereignty). 
 3. See Islam, supra note 2, at 43–47; see also Carmen G. Gonzalez, Migration as Reparation: Climate 
Change and the Disruption of Borders, 66 LOY. L. REV. 401, 408–13 (2020) [hereinafter Gonzalez, Migration 
as Reparation] (arguing that the operation of the Global North through the colonial, postcolonial, and neoliberal 
era has undermined the adaptive capacity of the Global South). 
 4. Johannes Friedrich, Mengpin Ge & Andrew Pickens, This Interactive Chart Shows Changes in the 
World’s Top 10 Emitters, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Dec. 10, 2020), http://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/
interactive-chart-top-emitters [https://perma.cc/Z7TP-BSRU]. 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process to produce legally 
binding liability.5 While attending to asymmetrical relationships between nation-states 
remains important for any critical endeavor in international legal scholarship, this Essay 
proposes that understanding the North-South divide solely in terms of nation-states is 
misguided. 
First, the emerging economic success of some developing nation-states—namely, 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—destabilizes the coherence of the Global 
South category.6 In the climate change realm, for example, China is a major emitter of 
greenhouse gases, but it remains part of the Global South negotiating bloc.7 Scholars 
insist on preserving the notion of the Global South as a set of economically 
disadvantaged states in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, 
claiming that Global South nation-states need not all be the same.8 While the Global 
South category may be sufficiently tensile to accommodate heterogeneity, 
globalization’s erosion of the nation-state still calls in to question the utility of theorizing 
power exclusively in Westphalian terms. 
Second, global capitalism operates across national borders to construct a widening 
divide between the rich and the poor in both the geographic North and South.9 According 
to the U.S. Federal Reserve, in the second quarter of 2020, the top 1% of Americans held 
30.7% of all household wealth in the United States, while the bottom 50% of the 
population held 1.9% of total wealth in the United States.10 Scholars William Robinson 
 
 5. Maxine Burkett, A Justice Paradox: On Climate Change, Small Island Developing States, and the 
Quest for Effective Legal Remedy, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 633, 634 (2013) (discussing the difficulty small island 
developing states experience in seeking climate remedies); see also Glenn Althor, James E.M. Watson & Richard 
A. Fuller, Global Mismatch Between Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Burden of Climate Change, SCI. REPS., 
Feb. 5, 2016, at 1, 1 (finding that twenty of the thirty-six highest-emitting countries are among the least 
vulnerable to adverse climate impacts, while eleven of the seventeen countries with low to moderate greenhouse 
gas emissions are extremely vulnerable to adverse climate impacts). 
 6. See B.S. Chimni, Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in the Twenty-First Century, 14 OR. 
REV. INT’L L. 17, 32–33 (2012) [hereinafter Chimni, Capitalism] (responding to the critique that international 
law cannot be imperialist because of the economic growth of certain developing nation-states within the confines 
of the liberal international economic order). 
 7. See The Member States of the Group of 77, GROUP OF 77, http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html 
[https://perma.cc/T5DD-L4K5] (last visited June 1, 2021) (listing members of the Group of 77, an 
intergovernmental organization comprised of developing countries with the goal of enhancing their joint 
negotiating capabilities at the United Nations). 
 8. See, e.g., Atapattu & Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 2. 
 9. The geographic North refers to a set of wealthy nation-states predominantly in North America, Europe, 
East Asia, and Australasia that are high-income economies or members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. See World Bank Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK, 
http://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 [https://perma.cc/BV7D-DH4L] (last visited 
June 1, 2021). The geographic South refers to nation-states that the World Bank classifies as 
upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income, or low-income economies, predominantly located in Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and the rest of Asia. See id. The terms “Global North” and “Global South” 
traditionally designate the geographic North and geographic South. See, e.g., Atapattu & Gonzalez, supra note 
1, at 2. However, this Essay distinguishes between the geographic category and the sociopolitical location. In 
particular, the Essay uses “Global South” to designate spaces and people sharing a similar experience of 
oppression in order to locate Global Souths across the geographic North and South. 
 10. Distribution of Household Wealth in the U.S. Since 1989, U.S. FED. RESERVE, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/#quarter:0;series:Net%20worth;demogra
692 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
and Jerry Harris argue that wealthy elites increasingly constitute a transnational capitalist 
class, including elites from the geographic South, who benefit from the transnational 
concentration of capital.11 This transnational accumulation of capital operates to the 
exclusion of an oppressed class in both the geographic North and South.12 In 
contemporary terms, then, the Global South, whose conceptual power lies in theorizing 
oppression, might more aptly encompass people and spaces commonly excluded under 
global capitalism regardless of their geographic location. As such, the Global South 
becomes a deterritorialized, socio-spatial mapping of the externalities of capitalist 
accumulation.13 
Leveraging the analytic lens of racial capitalism allows for an even sharper view. 
Capitalism operates to devalue racialized humans so that their lives become 
externalities.14 Accordingly, Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) around 
the world become disposable humanity who balance capitalist excess. In the logic of 
racial capitalism, Pacific Islanders rightly perish as climate change’s adverse effects 
render atoll and low-lying nation-states increasingly uninhabitable.15 Moreover, racial 
capitalism suggests that leaving Indigenous communities in the United States to face 
eroding lands, sacred sites, and cultural practices without a clear relocation plan is a 
necessary externality of a carbon-based economy. Global capitalism renders racialized 
humans as expendable across the North-South divide. 
Although international law traditionally governs interstate relations,16 making the 
Westphalian notion of the North-South divide a useful critical tool, global capitalism’s 
production of Global Souths in the North calls for a more nuanced analytical lens. This 
 
phic:networth;population:1,3,5,7;units:shares;range:2005.2,2020.2 [https://perma.cc/7AHF-5P9G] (select “Top 
1%” and “Bottom 50%” in “Display” selections) (last updated Mar. 19, 2021). 
 11. See William I. Robinson & Jerry Harris, Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the 
Transnational Capitalist Class, 64 SCI. & SOC’Y 11, 32–36 (2000). 
 12. Chimni, Capitalism, supra note 6, at 19. 
 13. ANNE GARLAND MAHLER, FROM THE TRICONTINENTAL TO THE GLOBAL SOUTH 32–33 (2018). 
 14. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Change, Race, and Migration, 1 J.L. & POL. ECON. 109, 117 (2020) 
[hereinafter Gonzalez, Climate Change] (claiming that residents of racial capitalism’s sacrifice zones are 
particularly susceptible to climate-related harms because of their status as “disposable”); see also Levi Gahman 
& Elise Hjalmarson, Border Imperialism, Racial Capitalism, and Geographies of Deracination, 18 ACME 107, 
115 (2019) (describing the discursive process of “socio-spatial racialization” so that some people and places are 
made to be wretched and therefore “killable”). See infra Part II.A for further discussion of racial capitalism. 
 15. See Alisa Ceri Warnock, Small Island Developing States of the Pacific and Climate Change: 
Adaptation and Alternatives, 4 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L L. 247, 262, 286 (2007) (asking at “what point in the UNFCCC 
negotiations will the economics of cost-benefit analysis intervene and subsume any progress towards adaptation 
for the Pacific Islands” and arguing that given the unfeasible costs of adaptation, abandonment and islanders 
losing their homelands must be considered a realistic future outcome). 
 16. Jeremy Bentham first used the term international law to refer to the body of legal rules, standards, 
and norms applicable to interstate relations. M.W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International 
Law,” 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 408–10 (1984). The traditional view of international law maintains this 
state-centric perspective, defining international law as the set of rules regulating states behavior in their relations 
with each other. See Math Noortmann et al., Non State Actors, 77 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONFS. 608, 610 (2016); 
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Essay proposes that the primary prism of analysis for TWAIL theorists—the geographic 
North-South divide—needs revising. It argues for reconceptualizing the Global South to 
include not only nation-states but also the people and spaces that racial capitalism 
positions as expendable in both the geographic North and South. This theoretical 
palimpsest is useful because it allows for the naming of a heretofore disregarded site of 
resistance in international law—Global Southerners in the North. 
Section I pays homage to TWAIL, the nation-state-based frame of critiquing 
international law along the North-South divide, tracing TWAIL scholarship’s evolution 
from the colonial to the neoliberal period. This Section shows that the literature primarily 
lies on a Westphalian notion of the Global South. It then highlights an emerging thread 
of TWAIL scholarship that understands the Global South as a political practice in order 
to push for a deterritorialized view of the Global South. 
Section II takes the deconstruction argument further, claiming that racial capitalism 
breaks down the geographic North-South divide. It posits that racial capitalism creates 
Global Souths and Southerners in the North—that is, racialized surplus populations that 
are also present in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. 
Section II uses climate displacement as an example to highlight expendability as a 
common defining experience for BIPOC across the geographic North-South divide. 
Section III builds on Section II’s claim that expendable Global South populations 
exist in the geographic North. It ultimately contends that Global Southerners in the 
geographic North are political agents with the capacity to shift the global political 
economy of international law. This Essay thus seeks to reinvigorate TWAIL scholarship 
by offering a new analytical understanding of the Global South. 
I.  DECONSTRUCTING THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 
This Section claims that TWAIL scholarship predominantly uses a 
nation-state-based frame in critiquing international legal issues along the North-South 
divide. While this geographical conceptualization of the North-South divide makes 
sense, given that international law primarily governs interstate relations, the rise of 
globalized racial capitalism demands the deconstruction of the Westphalian model of 
analysis. This Section first recounts TWAIL’s contention that international law works 
with imperialism and capitalism to disadvantage the Global South.17 It then highlights 
an emerging thread in TWAIL scholarship, which frames the Global South as political 
practice, to argue for a deterritorialized view of the Global South.18 
A. TWAIL & International Law 
TWAIL takes aim at international law’s deleterious effect on the Global South.19 
TWAIL scholars show that international law has historically disadvantaged people of the 
Global South, especially its subaltern groups, and continues to do so in an intimate 
 
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
 19. This Essay uses the term “Global South” in order to engage with a wider literature in law and political 
science. However, TWAIL scholars use a number of equivalent terms, including Third World or developing 
world. See Usha Natarajan, John Reynolds, Amar Bhatia & Sujith Xavier, Introduction: TWAIL - On Praxis and 
the Intellectual, 37 THIRD WORLD Q. 1946, 1955 n.1 (2016). 
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relationship with imperialism and capitalism.20 The TWAIL account has proceeded in 
two phases over time.21 The literature first focused on the effects of colonialism, and then 
it excavated the impact of globalization.22 Throughout these turns, scholars have 
maintained that international law creates and perpetuates racialized hierarchies.23 
 TWAIL’s first central task was to elucidate the relationship between 
international law and colonialism in order to correct the imbalance between Global North 
and Global South nation-states that arose from the colonial encounter.24 TWAIL, 
declining to view international law as a just system producing equitable results, broke 
new ground by claiming that international law facilitated the subordination of Global 
South nation-states.25 In so doing, TWAIL questioned international law’s legitimacy.26 
Scholars argued that colonialism was central to the development of international law.27 
For example, scholar Antony Anghie points to doctrines such as terra nullius and state 
recognition to demonstrate that international legal norms created a gateway to the group 
of so-called civilized nations.28 
A TWAIL approach to international environmental law links the history of colonial 
expansion and domination to contemporary environmental degradation.29 The Industrial 
Revolution of the nineteenth century, alongside massive development following the 
Second World War, fueled the current environmental crisis.30 Moreover, the inputs that 
fueled industrialization in Europe and North America were obtained through colonialism 
and imperialism.31 In the TWAIL account, international law justified the conquest of 
both nature and non-European peoples by purporting to advance civilization and 
development, and international law continues to bolster Northern hegemony.32 
Building on the tradition of excavating the effects of colonialism, TWAIL scholars 
further deploy the lens of neocolonialism to analyze the continued exploitation of the 
 
 20. Chimni, Capitalism, supra note 6, at 17–18. 
 21. See Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 79–84 (2003) (dividing TWAIL into two 
generations, wherein TWAIL I refers to scholarship immediately following decolonization, and TWAIL II refers 
to more recent intersectional scholarship that centers the experience of Third World peoples). But see George 
R.B. Galindo, Splitting TWAIL?, 33 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 37, 41 (2016) (arguing that periodization of 
TWAIL scholarship dilutes its coherence and thereby undermines its ability to influence “mainstream” 
international legal discourse). 
 22. Madhav Khosla, The TWAIL Discourse: The Emergence of a New Phase, 9 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 
291, 293 (2007). 
 23. See, e.g., Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. ANN. MEETING 31, 31 (2000). 
 24. ANGHIE, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Anghie and Chimni consider the contention that colonialism is central to the formation of 
international law as a feature of the second generation of TWAIL scholarship, TWAIL II. Anghie & Chimni, 
supra note 21, at 84. This Essay does not strictly adhere to the TWAIL I and TWAIL II paradigm. Rather, it 
seeks to map an account in terms of TWAIL’s engagement with colonialism and globalization. 
 28. See ANGHIE, supra note 1, at 78–79, 90–92. 
 29. Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse, 16 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 353, 387 (1997) [hereinafter Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage]. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Atapattu & Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
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Global South in the postcolonial period.33 Following political independence, the majority 
of Global Southern nation-states entered the global economy as raw materials exporters 
and manufactured goods importers.34 This economic specialization rendered them 
vulnerable to unfavorable terms for primary commodities relative to manufactured goods 
and to foreign investors in resource-extractive industries seeking to secure their 
investments by undercutting national sovereignty.35 Recognizing that the legal 
architecture of international economic law was erected while most Global Southern 
nation-states were still under colonial rule, the newly independent Southern nation-states 
demanded that global rules be rewritten to include their interests—articulating a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO).36 Included in the NIEO’s call for full equality 
among nation-states in solving global economic challenges was an invitation to pay 
special attention to countries severely impacted by economic crises and natural 
calamities.37 
More recent TWAIL scholarship proposes that global imperialism continues 
through an economic and legal structure “backed by a political formation constituted of 
the advanced capitalist states and a complex network of international institutions having 
the capability of using unrivalled force to realize the interests of global imperialism.”38 
The liberal mobility of goods, capital, and services, but not people, functions as one of 
the defining features of global imperialism.39 Rather than a disparate set of subjugating 
ideologies, the need for capitalism to expand into noncapitalist spaces renders a 
through-line across colonialism, neocolonialism, and contemporary global 
imperialism.40 Yet contemporary global imperialism produces a distinct erosion of the 
traditional North-South divide. 
Accounting for the economic rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, 
scholar B.S. Chimni claims that globalized capitalism superimposes a global class divide 
onto the North-South split.41 Chimni identifies a transnational class constituted by 
“segments of the capitalist class in the advanced capitalist countries and emerging 
economies that gain from the globalization process at the expense of the subaltern classes 
in both the First and the Third Worlds,” what Chimni calls the transnational oppressed 
 
 33. Chimni, Capitalism, supra note 6, at 27–28; see also BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 108 (2003) 
[hereinafter RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW] (noting international law’s construction of 
structural poverty as the “working principle of the process whereby the domain of interaction between the West 
and the non-West was defined”). Although this Essay presents TWAIL scholarship as following a linear 
progression, TWAIL scholars across time revisit central questions that arose from decolonization. See Karin 
Mickelson, Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories, 10 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 355, 361 (2008). 
 34. Atapattu & Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 6. 
 35. Id.; LIZ YOUNG, WORLD HUNGER 41 (1997); see also KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 78–100 (2013). 
 36. See G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
(May 1, 1974). For a historical account of the NIEO, see generally QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END 
OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM (2018). 
 37. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), supra note 36, § 4(c). 
 38. Chimni, Capitalism, supra note 6, at 32. 
 39. Id. at 31. 
 40. Id. at 24. 
 41. Id. at 18–19. 
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classes.42 As such, it becomes impossible to discuss the Global North and South solely 
in geographic terms, especially given that the utility of the concept of the Global North 
and South is to articulate differences in power.43 Thus TWAIL’s commitment to 
contemporary forms of imperialism has itself eroded its primary prism of analysis: the 
divide between Global South and Global North nation-states. Rather than a theoretical 
crisis, this Essay takes this problem as a theoretical opportunity.44 
B. Deterritorializing the Global South 
TWAIL scholarship gestures toward a deterritorialized view of the Global South. 
Theorists originally conceived of the “Third World” as a geographical space non-aligned 
with the dimensions that the Cold War shaped.45 Contemporary scholars now use an 
array of terms, including the Third World, Global South, and developing world, to refer 
to spaces that did not directly participate in the evolution of the institutions of modern 
capitalist democracy, which are home to more than three-fourths of contemporary 
humanity.46 Yet, theorists have increasingly complicated the terms. 
A first problematization of the Global South renders the notion as a positioning of 
the global poor within the global political economy. In this account, the Global South 
“consists of the victims and the powerless in the international economy,” which 
constitutes the majority of the world’s population but enjoys limited influence “over the 
manner in which the nations of the world arrange their economic affairs.”47 Although 
this Essay ultimately opposes the framing of Global Southerners as recipients rather than 
participants in international rulemaking, what is important here is the theoretical move 
to define the Global South by conditions, not geography.48 
Other theorists concerned with the power of the global majority conceive of the 
Global South as a social movement—“an international protest of the weak against the 
strong, or the poor against the rich.”49 In making room to view the Global South as a 
counterhegemonic discursive practice, these scholars seem to liberate the Global South 
from its geographic and nation-state-based moorings.50 Although various theoretical 
works cast the Global South as a political mechanism for transnational oppressed classes 
rather than a set of nation-states, the literature predominantly reproduces the Westphalian 
 
 42. Id. at 19. 
 43. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 334–35 (2000). 
 44. This Essay makes the case that the erosion of the geographical conception of the Global South makes 
it possible to locate a heretofore unnamed political power in Section III. 
 45. Mark T. Berger, The End of the ‘Third World’?, 15 THIRD WORLD Q. 257, 259 (1994). The end of 
the Cold War rendered the term “Third World” less resonant by some accounts. See, e.g., GUY ARNOLD, THE 
END OF THE THIRD WORLD 14 (1993) (explaining that the Third World concept depended on a division between 
“East” and “West” that was later replaced with a divide between prosperity and poverty). 
 46. See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED 3 (2004). 
 47. Julius K. Nyerere, South-South Option, in THE THIRD WORLD STRATEGY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
COHESION IN THE SOUTH 9, 10 (Altaf Gauhar ed.,1983). 
 48. See, e.g., id. In Migrants Can Make International Law, I argue that Global Southerners, including 
migrants from the Global South, can be international norm creators. See Ama Ruth Francis, Migrants Can Make 
International Law, 45 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 99, 149 (2021) [hereinafter Francis, Migrants Can]. 
 49. Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage, supra note 29, at 357. 
 50. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Comment, Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography, 1998 THIRD 
WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1, 20 [hereinafter Rajagopal, Locating the Third World]. 
2021] GLOBAL SOUTHERNERS IN THE NORTH 697 
framing of the North-South divide. Legal theorist Karin Mickelson, for example, 
critiques the framing of the Global South as a social movement because it violates the 
sanctity of the nation-state as the primary prism of analysis for TWAIL scholars.51 
Thus, the literature remains caught between understanding international law as 
structuring a subordinate relationship between Global North and Global South 
nation-states, and increasingly framing the Global South as a political practice. However, 
unmooring the Global South from geography is useful. If the Global South “is not defined 
by political geography, but by the actual contestation of power formations such as gender 
oppression, it is possible to think of transnational linkages among the oppressed.”52 The 
rest of this Essay seeks to liberate the literature from its ambivalence by building on the 
conception of the Global South as a deterritorialized political practice and further claims 
that doing so makes it possible to locate Global Southern political power within the 
Global North as a form of resistance in international law. 
II.  GLOBAL SOUTHERNERS AS EXTERNALITIES ACROSS THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 
Although scholars primarily analyze Global South international legal issues 
through a strict nation-state-based lens, contemporary racial capitalism operates to create 
Global Souths in the North. As such, understanding the Global South as a collection of 
nation-states that international law disadvantages erases the people and spaces who 
experience disenfranchisement under globalized capitalism in the geographic North. This 
Section argues that racial capitalism renders Global Souths in the North, and further, that 
Global Southern people in the North—like the oppressed class in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific—are made to be capitalism’s externalities.53 It 
then uses climate displacement as an example, demonstrating that hegemonic human 
rights approaches will not correct the asymmetrical balance of power in the global 
political economy.54 
A. Racial Capitalism Renders Global Souths in the North 
Capitalism operates through the logic of racism.55 Although law and economy 
literature views capitalism to operate as a neutral arbiter of cost-benefit tradeoffs, critical 
 
 51. Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage, supra note 29, at 358–59. This is ironic because for scholar Robert 
Rothstein, whose work Mickelson draws on to point to the Global South as a social movement, the members of 
the international protest are states. Robert L. Rothstein, Limits and Possibilities of Weak Theory: Interpreting 
North-South, 44 J. INT’L AFF. 159, 175–76 (1990); see also Valerie Phillips, Indigenous Peoples and the Role of 
the Nation-State, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 319, 320 (2007) [hereinafter Phillips, Indigenous Peoples] 
(pointing to TWAIL scholars’ resistance to central assumptions in international law but unwillingness to 
challenge the concept of the nation-state itself). 
 52. Rajagopal, Locating the Third World, supra note 50, at 20. Note that Rajagopal, in saying this, was 
speaking to transnational linkages at the local level, including the voices of indigenous people and women. Id. 
at 19–20. 
 53. See infra Part II.A. 
 54. See infra Part II.B. 
 55. See CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION 9 
(2000). 
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race scholars show that the market consistently produces losers along racialized lines.56 
Scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore thus defines racism not as the operation of discrimination 
based on the social construct of race but rather as “state-sanctioned or extralegal 
production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.”57 
This Essay argues that racial capitalism generates a disposable humanity through its 
hierarchical construction of presumably valuable and worthless humans.58 
Racial capitalism renders the lives of racialized classes of humans as externalities 
across the North-South divide. Legal scholar Carmen Gonzalez points out that racialized 
exclusion creates “stigmatized geographic locations—including reservations, ghettos, 
export-processing zones, extractive zones, and the Third World—where the land and the 
people have been rendered expendable and disposable.”59 Indeed, these expendable 
people and spaces are made across the geographic Global North and Global South. 
Geographer Laura Pulido refers to “surplus populations” in the United States, claiming 
that these surplus humans are disproportionately nonwhite by design, given that “[t]he 
devaluation of Black (and other nonwhite) bodies has been a central feature of global 
capitalism for centuries.”60 Flint, Michigan, serves as a bleak example. It was possible 
for state officials to poison Flint’s mostly Black residents because their lives purportedly 
did not matter.61 
Environmental issues, and climate change in particular, demonstrate with stark 
clarity racial capitalism’s devaluing of nonwhite people and its transformation of the 
places they call home into sacrifice zones.62 As Pulido so clearly puts it, “[p]oor, 
segregated, people of color, whether on a reservation, el campo, or in the inner city, 
experience a distinct, brutal reality that is key to accumulation of power and profits for 
elites. Their ‘value,’ if one can call it that, is in their general expendability.”63 The fact 
 
 56. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces, and the Role of Critical Race Theory 
in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An Institutional Class Analysis, in CROSSROADS, 
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 310, 320–21 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (defining 
new racialism as the view that racial differences, including wealth inequality, are the natural outcomes of the 
free market). But see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 
YALE L.J. 1757, 1761 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 
supra) (arguing that law and economics and critical race theory can be mutually generative discourses). 
 57. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN 
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 28 (2007). 
 58. See JULIAN AGUON, WHAT WE BURY AT NIGHT: DISPOSABLE HUMANITY 226 (2008) (using the term 
“disposable humanity” to describe Pacific Islanders in the face of the existential threat of climate change). 
 59. Gonzalez, Migration as Reparation, supra note 3, at 407–08. 
 60. Laura Pulido, Flint, Environmental Racism, and Racial Capitalism, CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM, 
July 27, 2016, at 1, 1; see also HILARY MCD. BECKLES, THE FIRST BLACK SLAVE SOCIETY: BRITAIN’S 
“BARBARITY TIME” IN BARBADOS, 1636–1876, at xiv (2016) (describing Black death under plantation slavery as 
a new era in global economic development and race relations). 
 61. Pulido points out that although White residents were also affected, the analysis holds given that Flint 
is racialized as Black. Pulido, supra note 60, at 2, 8. 
 62. See STEVE LERNER, SACRIFICE ZONES: THE FRONT LINES OF TOXIC CHEMICAL EXPOSURE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 5 (2010) (highlighting that low-income communities and communities of color in the United 
States live in the most heavily polluted neighborhoods); see also Gonzalez, Migration as Reparation, supra note 
3, at 408–13 (applying the lens of racial capitalism to climate change to point to the operation of a carbon 
capitalism that exploits racialized human beings). 
 63. Pulido, supra note 60, at 8 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
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that the cost is borne by “expendable” people and places is what allows both capital and 
the law to advance deadly norms and practice in the environmental context.64 
Scholars of the Global South point to the negative experiences under contemporary 
global capitalism, environmental and otherwise, to deterritorialize the North-South 
divide. 65 As such, the Global South becomes “a geographically flexible, sociospatial 
mapping of the so-called externalities of capitalist accumulation.”66 Expendability is 
what defines the Global South, not national borders; and racial capitalism renders Global 
Southerners as externalities across the North-South divide. 
B. The Example of Climate Displacement 
Climate displacement refers to the forced movement of primarily BIPOC within or 
across national borders due to climate-related disasters.67 The majority of people are 
displaced within their own nation-states, primarily in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
as well as Africa.68 Yet, climate displacement also occurs in North America, especially 
in Black and Indigenous communities.69 Although scholars commonly frame climate 
displacement as a North-South issue where carbon pollution exported from the 
 
 64. Id.; see also Michael McIntyre & Heidi J. Nast, Bio(necro)polis: Marx, Surplus Populations, and the 
Spatial Dialectics of Reproduction and “Race,” 43 ANTIPODE 1465, 1467 (2011) (referring to disposable people 
as a necropolis in contrast to the “biopolis,” where the lives and well-being of subjects matter). 
 65. See, e.g., Eric Sheppard & Richa Nagar, From East-West to North-South, 36 ANTIPODE 557, 558 
(2004) (“[T]he [G]lobal North is constituted through a network of political and economic elites spanning 
privileged localities across the globe.”); see also GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOUTH 3 (Caroline Thomas & Peter 
Wilkin eds., 1997) (calling theorists to “liberate our thinking from the constraints imposed by interpretation 
within a territorially-based state-centric worldview, which concentrates on a North/South gap in terms of 
states”). 
 66. MAHLER, supra note 13, at 33 (describing the Global South as “an emergent political imagination 
undergirding contemporary social movements”). 
 67. See Walter Kälin, Displacement Caused by the Effects of Climate Change: Who Will Be Affected and 
What Are the Gaps in the Normative Framework for Their Protection?, BROOKINGS (Oct. 10, 2008), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/displacement-caused-by-the-effects-of-climate-change-who-will-be-affecte
d-and-what-are-the-gaps-in-the-normative-framework-for-their-protection/ [https://perma.cc/S22F-W8YS] 
(discussing various scenarios to help identify whether movement is forced or voluntary, among other things). 
Scholars use a range of terms to describe climate displacement, including climate-induced migration and climate 
mobility. This Essay uses the term climate displacement to clearly bring into view the involuntary nature of 
some climate-related movement. 
 68. Khalid Koser, Climate Change and Internal Displacement: Challenges to the Normative Framework, 
in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 289, 289 (Étienne Piguet et al. eds., 2011) (showing that the majority of 
environmental migration occurs within national borders); Roman Hoffmann, Anna Dimitrova, Raya Muttarak, 
Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Jonas Peisker, A Meta-Analysis of Country-Level Studies on Environmental Change 
and Migration, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 904, 904 (2020) (surveying studies on environmental migration 
to show that the strongest relationship between environmental events and migration outcomes occurs in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and Africa). 
 69. The first communities in the United States to undergo planned relocation due to climate-related 
impacts are Indigenous. See, e.g., Adam Crepelle, The United States First Climate Relocation: Recognition, 
Relocation, and Indigenous Rights at the Isle de Jean Charles, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 1, 3 (2018). African 
Americans have also been disproportionately displaced by both environmental events and climate gentrification. 
See, e.g., Lauren Phillips, Comment, Go North, Young Man: The Great Climate Migration and America’s 
Shrinking Cities, 10 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 74, 79 (2020) (describing the effects of Hurricane Katrina on 
African Americans and climate gentrification’s impact on Little Haiti). 
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geographic North displaces people from the geographic South,70 the experience of 
racialized communities in the geographic North disrupts this framing. 
The Pacific serves as one example of expendability in this context. The population 
from low-lying atoll nations face near complete dispossession of their lands and 
territorial waters due to sea level rise and its corresponding effects on habitability.71 
Saltwater intrusion, soil salinization, and flooding in Pacific nation-states undermine 
fresh water availability and agricultural capacity, which are necessary for sustaining 
human life.72 Similarly, Indigenous communities in the United States have started 
relocation processes due to the existential threat that the climate-related hazards of 
erosion and flooding pose.73 
The normative response to the challenge of climate displacement across the 
geographic North and South draws principally from international human rights law.74 
Climate change and displacement undermine the enjoyment of individual human rights, 
including rights to life, health, housing, food, water, and education, as well as cultural 
and collective rights, including the right to self-determination and the rights of 
Indigenous peoples.75 When climate displacement occurs within national borders, 
nation-states remain obligated to protect the rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
under international human rights law76 and in accordance with the 1998 U.N. Guiding 
 
 70. See, e.g., Gonzalez, Migration as Reparation, supra note 3, at 403–04. 
 71. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recently reported that atoll islands could be rendered 
uninhabitable in the event of a 1.5 degrees Celsius temperature increase scenario. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 234 box 3.5 (2018); see also Jane McAdam, 
Building International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters, and Displacement, 33 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS 
JUST. 1, 7–8 (2016) [hereinafter McAdam, Building International Approaches] (noting that various elements of 
statehood may be undermined before the entire territory of an island state disappears). 
 72. See McAdam, Building International Approaches, supra note 71, at 7–8. 
 73. The U.S. government identified thirty-one Alaskan Native communities that are facing imminent 
threats caused by flooding and erosion, twelve of which considered or decided on planned relocation. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-551, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON 
RELOCATING VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION 12 (2009). As of 2020, two Indigenous 
communities in the United States have started relocation processes. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-20-488, CLIMATE CHANGE: A CLIMATE MIGRATION PILOT PROGRAM COULD ENHANCE THE NATION’S 
RESILIENCE AND REDUCE FEDERAL FISCAL EXPOSURE 13 (2020). 
 74. The literature increasingly promotes the use of migration pathways within the framework of 
immigration law as a climate displacement response. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 73/195, annex, Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration ¶ 21 (Dec. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Global Compact]; see also David James 
Cantor, Environment, Mobility, and International Law: A New Approach in the Americas, 21 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
263, 297–98 (2021). 
 75. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons), 
Rep. on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/75/207 (July 21, 2020); U.N. High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, Rep. on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, ¶¶ 20–44, 
51–54, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009). The U.N. Human Rights Committee has adopted the view that 
climate change constitutes one of the “most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future 
generations to enjoy the right to life,” alongside environmental degradation and unsustainable development, 
under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the 
Right to Life, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018). 
 76. Jimenez-Damary, supra note 75, ¶ 41. 
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Principles on Internal Displacement.77 Nation-states must also take affirmative and 
remedial steps to protect people from threats to life and other rights-related impacts of 
natural hazards and displacement.78 
The International Law Commission (ILC) recently provided guidance on the 
protection of rights and the needs of people when disaster occurs. The ILC’s Draft 
Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters (ILC Draft Articles) define 
disaster to include mass displacement and affirm the duty of states to protect their human 
rights and accord with humanitarian principles.79 Similar to the ILC Draft Articles, the 
International Law Association (ILA) Committee on International Law and Sea Level 
Rise’s 2018 Sydney Declaration of Principles on the Protection of Persons Displaced in 
the Context of Sea Level Rise affirms the importance of human rights in this context and 
further encourages states to “facilitate cross-border migration in anticipation of, or in 
reaction to, irreversible environmental degradation or sudden-onset disasters linked to 
sea level rise.”80 Drawing on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
from the UNFCCC, the ILA recommends that states amend domestic law to facilitate 
cross-border migration.81 Nation-states remain obligated to protect human rights 
regardless of immigration status.82 
 
 77. Francis M. Deng (U.N. Secretary-General’s Representative on Internally Displaced Persons), Rep. of 
the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Commission 
Resolution 1997/39: Addendum, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]; see also U.N. High Comm’r for 
Refugees, Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement 5 (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.unhcr.org/4da2b5e19.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2L6-9HY5] (noting that no new principles need to be 
developed on international displacement in the context change given that the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement cover climate-related processes). 
 78. David R. Boyd (Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy, and Sustainable Environment), Rep. on the Issue of Human Rights 
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, ¶¶ 62–70, U.N. 
Doc. A/74/161 (July 15, 2019); see also Bruce Burson, Walter Kälin, Jane McAdam & Sanjula Weerasinghe, 
The Duty To Move People Out of Harm’s Way in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters, 37 REFUGEE 
SURV. Q. 379, 384–88 (2018). 
 79. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10, ¶ 48 (2016). 
 80. Int’l Law Ass’n Comm. on Int’l Law & Sea Level Rise Res. 6/2018, Sydney Declaration of Principles 
on the Protection of Persons Displaced in the Context of Sea Level Rise, at princ. 4(2)(a)(iii) (2018) [hereinafter 
Sydney Declaration]. 
 81. The ILA’s report following the Sydney Conference states that, “[i]n order to make migration a 
realistic and manageable option, States of destination should review or amend their domestic laws to facilitate 
such migration, building on existing good practices in the spirit of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities.” Int’l Law Ass’n, Sydney Conference on International Law and Sea Level Rise 38 (2018), 
http://www.ila-hq.org/images/ILA/DraftReports/DraftReport_SeaLevelRise.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5GQ-
AQFC]. Note also that UNFCCC parties endorsed the recommendation of the Executive Committee of the 
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts to formulate 
law, policy, and strategies to address climate mobility, while considering human rights obligations. U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Executive Comm. of the Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts, ¶ 1(g)(i), Dec. 10/CP.24, annex, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1, at 43 (Mar. 19, 2019). 
 82. Human Mobility and Human Rights in the COVID-19 Pandemic: Principles of Protection for 
Migrants, Refugees, and Other Displaced Persons, 32 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 549, 549 (2020). 
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Reflecting the normative framework’s focus, climate displacement jurisprudence is 
grounded primarily in international human rights and refugee law.83 Here, this Essay 
presents two petitions that highlight climate displacement as an issue impacting Global 
Southerners across the North-South divide: Teitiota v. New Zealand84 and Rights of 
Indigenous People in Addressing Climate-Forced Displacement.85 First, in Teitiota, a 
Kiribati national claimed in a communication to the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC) that New Zealand had violated his right to life under Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by removing him to 
Kiribati where the impacts of climate change posed life-threatening conditions.86 Sea 
level rise in Kiribati, the petitioner claimed, had resulted in land scarcity and subsequent 
disputes that endangered Teitiota’s life, and saltwater contamination had limited the 
availability of potable water.87 The UNHRC ruled that the communication was 
admissible; the petitioner sufficiently showed that he faced a real risk of impairment to 
his right to life due to climate change and sea level rise impacts as a result of New 
Zealand’s decision to remove him.88 
The UNHRC ultimately decided against the petitioner, noting that it could 
determine only whether New Zealand’s consideration of the risks to Teitiota’s life was 
arbitrary or a manifest error or denial of justice.89 Based on that standard, the UNHRC 
upheld New Zealand’s assessment that Teitiota had not provided sufficient evidence that 
 
 83. This Essay includes within the scope of climate displacement jurisprudence any communication, 
petition, or complaint that raises a material issue of law or fact concerning mobility in the context of disasters 
and climate change. This definition draws on the one used by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and the 
Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics to collect cases within the Sabin Center for 
Climate Change Law’s United States and Non-U.S. Climate Change Litigation charts. See Geetanjali Ganguly, 
Joana Setzer & Veerle Heyvaert, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change, 38 
OXFORD J. L. STUD. 1, 3 (2018) (defining climate change litigation as the “rapidly growing body of lawsuits in 
which climate change and its impacts are either a contributing or key consideration in legal argumentation and 
adjudication”). 
 84. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5(4) of the 
Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Oct. 24, 2019). 
 85. Alaska Institute for Justice, Rights of Indigenous People in Addressing Climate-Forced 
Displacement, in a complaint dated Jan. 15, 2020 from the Alaska Institute for Justice addressed to Cecilia 
Jimenez-Damary et al. (Special Rapporteurs) (Jan. 15, 2020), http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-
litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2020/20200116_NA_complaint-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2HLP-EN2T]. 
 86. Teitiota filed a communication to the UNHRC after applying for refugee status with the New Zealand 
Immigration and Protection Tribunal and appealing the tribunal’s decision all the way to the New Zealand 
Supreme Court. Teitiota, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, ¶ 1.1. The Supreme Court noted that its ruling 
against the petitioner “did not mean that environmental degradation resulting from climate change or other 
natural disasters could never create a pathway into the Refugee Convention or protected person jurisdiction.” 
Teitiota v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment [2015] NZSC 107 at [13] 
(N.Z.). A recent U.N. guidance document clarifies that people displaced by climate change can have a valid 
claim for refugee status under international and regional refugee law. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Legal 
Considerations Regarding Claims for International Protection Made in the Context of the Adverse Effects of 
Climate Change and Disasters ¶¶ 3–4 (Oct. 1, 2020), http://www.refworld.org/docid/5f75f2734.html 
[https://perma.cc/98GH-C4S6]. 
 87. Teitiota, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, ¶ 2.1. 
 88. Id. ¶ 8.6. 
 89. Id. ¶¶ 9.7–9.9. 
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he would face irreparable climate-related harm due to land disputes, difficulty growing 
food, or accessing potable water.90 However, the UNHRC left the door open to future 
climate mobility claims, stating: 
The Committee is of the view that without robust national and international 
efforts, the effects of climate change in receiving states may expose 
individuals to a violation of their rights under [A]rticles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, 
thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations of sending states. 
Furthermore, given that the risk of an entire country becoming submerged 
under water is such an extreme risk, the conditions of life in such a country 
may become incompatible with the right to life with dignity before the risk is 
realized.91 
Thus, the UNHRC asserted that the ICCPR obligates states not to return people 
fleeing life-threatening climate change impacts. Although the decision is not legally 
binding, the international legal principles upon which it is based are.92 Teitiota indicates 
that individuals and groups who have crossed national borders could file subsequent 
petitions against deportation to the UNHRC, after exhausting domestic options, based on 
climate change impacts that violate the right to life.93 
Second, five U.S. indigenous tribes filed a complaint with the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons among others, alleging 
that the United States violates their human rights by failing to address climate 
displacement.94 The complaint highlights the combined effects of climate change and 
capitalism, pointing to the environmental degradation wrought by the oil and gas 
industry.95 According to the complaint, the U.S. government’s failure has resulted in 
destruction of life, livelihoods, health, and heritage, as well as the loss of ancestral 
homelands.96 Across the North-South divide, climate change combined with racial 
capitalism threatens the lives of BIPOC, including those of future generations.97 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. ¶ 9.11. 
 92. Jane McAdam, Protecting People Displaced by the Impacts of Climate Change: The UN Human 
Rights Committee and the Principle of Non-Refoulement, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 708, 708 n.2 (2020). 
 93. The Committee is expected to issue a view in 2021 on a communication from Torres Islanders, which 
could further articulate nation-state obligations to those facing displacement due to climate change impacts. In 
2019, Torres Islanders filed a complaint with the UNHRC, alleging that the government of Australia had violated 
their fundamental rights under Articles 6 and 27 of the ICCPR by failing to take adequate climate action. See 
Petition of Torres Strait Islanders to the United Nations Human Rights Committee Alleging Violations Stemming 
from Australia’s Inaction on Climate Action, CLIMATE CASE CHART, http://climatecasechart.com/climate-
change-litigation/non-us-case/petition-of-torres-strait-islanders-to-the-united-nations-human-rights-committee-
alleging-violations-stemming-from-australias-inaction-on-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/MDQ2-WRDD] 
(last visited June 1, 2021). The Torres Islanders, traditional owners of the Great Barrier Reef, claim that climate 
change will force them to move to mainland Australia, resulting in severe human rights impacts, including 
cultural losses. Karima Bennoune (Special Rapporteur on the Field of Cultural Rights), International Legal 
Frameworks Related to Climate Change, Culture and Cultural Rights, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/75/298, annex (Oct. 
10, 2020); CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 3 (2020). 
 94. Alaska Institute for Justice, supra note 85, at 3. 
 95. Id. at 4. 
 96. Id. at 9. 
 97. A youth-led, pan-Pacific campaign has sharpened this exploration, calling on the Pacific Island Forum 
to seek an advisory opinion on climate change from the ICJ that asks: “What are the obligations of states under 
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Although climate displacement jurisprudence plays a critical role in carving 
avenues for justice for climate-displaced persons, human rights claims made by 
individual and community petitioners alone are unlikely to shift the global political 
economy that has unequally distributed climate change’s adverse effects.98 The 
humanitarian response prioritizes the protection of human rights but may elide climate 
justice by sidestepping industrialized countries’ historic responsibility for climate 
change.99  
As such, many theorists argue for a distributive response. Professor Carmen G. 
Gonzalez claims that “affluent countries (the Global North)” should reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions, provide development assistance for adaptation that allows 
people to stay in place, and extend reparations to climate-displaced persons.100 She 
argues this approach is warranted due to the Global North’s disproportionate historical 
and current contribution to climate change and its role in producing climate vulnerability 
“through colonial and post-colonial military, economic, and political interventions that 
increased poverty and equality in much of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific 
(the Global South).”101 
While this Essay is sympathetic to this line of argument, the argument takes the 
only agent in international law to be the nation-state, thereby missing the collective 
power of a transnational alliance of oppressed people across the North-South divide. 
Professor Harold Hongiu Koh has demonstrated that international law is constituted 
through a dynamic interplay between domestic and international legal norms, and those 
domestic norms are created through domestic political processes.102 As such, it is 
possible for a transnational alliance of Global Southerners to shape international legal 
norms.103 
 
international law to protect the rights of present and future generations against the adverse effects of climate 
change?” PAC. ISLANDS STUDENTS FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE, BRIEFING: AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE ADVISORY OPINION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2019), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5d01ae3bc1dd970001e45b42/t/5d26db6211277e0001a9e903/1562827621180/PISFCC+Briefing+ICJ+AO+on
+CC.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBR3-CNAX]. In taking a rights-focused framing, the proposed question could elicit 
a response from the ICJ that touches on climate displacement, especially given that the most substantive 
jurisprudence on climate displacement has emerged from human rights bodies. 
 98. Research shows that some nation-states stand to gain from anthropogenic climate change, namely 
cooler, wealthier countries. Noah S. Diffenbaugh & Marshall Burke, Global Warming Has Increased Global 
Economic Inequality, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9808, 9808 (2019). 
 99. Gonzalez, Climate Change, supra note 14, at 123–25 (characterizing the humanitarian response as 
superior to the national security response but claiming that the humanitarian response relies on the charity of 
Global North countries and is therefore “inconsistent with a climate justice approach”). 
 100. Gonzalez, Migration as Reparation, supra note 3, at 403. 
 101. Id. at 404. 
 102. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2646–49 
(1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995), and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)). 
 103. For a full account of displaced persons ability to shape international law, see Francis, Migrants Can, 
supra note 48. 
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III.  GLOBAL SOUTHERNERS AS POLITICAL AGENTS IN THE “NORTH” 
This Essay has argued in previous Sections that while legal scholars predominantly 
frame North-South issues in terms of a conflict between nation-states differently situated 
by and within international law, globalized capitalism erodes the geographic bounds of 
dispossession. Rather than solely a set of nation-states who share a postcolonial history 
and comparable levels of economic development, the Global South also encompasses 
people and spaces that contemporary global capitalism renders expendable. As such, 
there are Souths and Southerners within the geographic North, and Norths and 
Northerners within the geographic South. This Section puts this deterritorialized view of 
the Global South to use, claiming the existence of Global Southerners in the geographic 
North as political agents104 with the capacity to shift the global political economy of 
international law.105 
A. Global South, Global Southerners, and Political Praxis 
In framing the Global South as political praxis, scholars increasingly argue that 
spaces marked as the Global South exist within the geographic Global North. Notable 
TWAIL scholar B.S. Chimni, for example, intimates that the “real concern of the       
North . . . is the defen[s]e of global capitalism that guarantees unprecedented affluence 
to certain sections of the Northern, and now small sections of the Southern, citizenry.”106 
Building on Chimni’s work, international legal scholar Prabhakar Singh understands the 
Global South as a “currency for identifying the deprived of both the North and the South” 
beyond the Westphalian nation-state paradigm.107 
Deterritorializing the notion of the Global South within the context of global 
capitalism is useful because it highlights a site of political potential. Historian Vijay 
Prashad goes so far as to define the Global South as political resistance, calling it a 
“concatenation of protests against the theft of the commons, against the theft of human 
dignity and rights.”108 If human rights frameworks dominate the response to climate 
displacement, then it is the Global South that pushes against the evisceration of those 
rights. Rethinking the Global South beyond the confines of the nation-state unites “the 
poor and the marginalized of the world under one umbrella,” with the capacity to resist 
the discriminatory operation of international law.109 
Indeed, identifying a transnational class of expendable humans across the 
North-South divide presents an opportunity to reshape international legal norms. 
 
 104. See infra Part III.A. 
 105. See infra Part III.B. 
 106. B.S. Chimni, The Birth of a ‘Discipline’: From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies, 22 J. REFUGEE 
STUD. 11, 24 (2009) [hereinafter Chimni, The Birth of a Discipline]. 
 107. Prabhakar Singh, Indian International Law: From a Colonized Apologist to a Subaltern Protagonist, 
23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 79, 97 (2010). Singh does not argue for the dissolution of the nation-state, but rather seeks 
to highlight the potential for resistance that emerges when rethinking the Global South beyond geographical 
lines. See id. 
 108. VIJAY PRASHAD, THE POORER NATIONS: A POSSIBLE HISTORY OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH 9 (2012); see 
also Prem Kumar Rajaram, Refugees as Surplus Population: Race, Migration and Capitalist Value Regimes, 23 
NEW POL. ECON. 627, 637 (2018) (arguing that seeing refugees and migrants as surplus populations alongside 
other marginalized groups provides a basis for a politics of solidarity). 
 109. Singh, supra note 107, at 97. 
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Resistance within and against international law would benefit from new actors, emerging 
from new geographies, of disparate colors.110 Reconceptualizing the Global South also 
expands the notion of the participants in and sources of international law. Legal scholar 
Amar Bhatia, in naming North American Indigenous perspectives as South of the North, 
for example, claims that international law would benefit from Indigenous legal traditions 
and inter-National laws.111 
This Essay proposes building on the scholarship that understands the Global South 
as a transnational subaltern resistance to highlight the particular potential of Global 
Southerners in the geographic North to overcome intransigent issues of the North-South 
divide. While an increasing number of theorists refer to Global Souths in the North, this 
Essay takes their thinking further by understanding the Global South to include a 
collectivized set of political agents. It is not just Souths in the North but also Southerners 
in the North. This distinction is important for linking Global South theory to a larger 
discourse on how private actors influence international law through the domestic political 
process.112 The agency of Global Southerners in the geographic North in particular has 
the potential to overcome intransigent issues of the North-South divide by producing 
resistance from the inside out. The next Part contextualizes this argument within climate 
displacement discourse. 
B. Global South Organizing for Anticipatory Approaches to Climate Displacement 
Locating the collective power of Global Southerners within Northern nation-states 
is important for climate displacement because it highlights a heretofore overlooked 
source of power within national borders for advocating for climate solutions. Global 
Southerners in the North could catalyze domestic efforts in at least three ways. First, 
Global Southerners could mobilize to advance climate action within the judicial system. 
Second, Global Southerners could join with other groups to further advocacy efforts. 
Third, Global Southerners could organize politically to push for the adoption of relevant 
legislation. 
Given that the majority of climate displacement occurs within national borders,113 
and further, that international adjudication and multilateral agreements require domestic 
 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Amar Bhatia, The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to International Law 
with Lessons from the Fourth World, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 131, 173 (2012). There is some debate over the 
inclusion of Indigenous peoples within TWAIL scholarship, but Bhatia argues that identifying the particular 
Southern experience of Indigenous peoples living in the North would enrich TWAIL’s perspective. Id. at         
157–58; see also Phillips, Indigenous Peoples, supra note 51, at 319 (advocating for the recognition of 
Indigenous peoples in reimagining the modern nation-state). 
 112. See ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43–44 (Malcolm 
Evans & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2007) (describing the “exponential growth” of nonstate actor activity in the 
international arena); Jean d’Aspremont, Cognitive Conflicts and the Making of International Law: From 
Empirical Concord to Conceptual Discord in Legal Scholarship, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1119, 1126–28 
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 113. Environmental Migration, MIGRATION DATA PORTAL, http://migrationdataportal.org/themes/
environmental_migration [https://perma.cc/B4YZ-5GZ5] (last updated May 6, 2021). 
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enforcement,114 national efforts to address climate displacement are integral. National 
governments are required to protect the human rights of those citizens displaced within 
their borders by climate-related events as codified by the 1998 U.N. Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement.115 Yet incorporating this framework into domestic law, and 
strengthening the capacity of national and local actors to implement it, remains a 
challenge.116 Furthermore, in the absence of an international oversight body to guarantee 
enforcement of relevant legal norms, domestic legal action will play a critical response 
in building the climate displacement response.117 
However, without a shift in the conditions of power, national efforts to address 
climate displacement are likely to remain concentrated in countries marked by limited 
resource capacity. Here, international refugee and migration law is illustrative. The 
developing world hosts eighty percent of all refugees.118 The United States, Australia, 
and a handful of other industrialized countries refused to sign the first intergovernmental 
migration agreement, the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration 
(Global Compact).119 Without restructurings in the global political economy, Global 
South nation-states will continue to lead the effort to address climate displacement, both 
internal and cross-border, without corresponding action from Global North 
nation-states.120 This unequal burden sharing constitutes a “justice paradox,” where the 
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and Canada in their responses to climate mobility. See Ama Francis, Global Governance of Environmental 
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nation-states who have least contributed to climate change face its most severe impacts 
and demonstrate the greatest political will for climate action.121 Reconceptualizing the 
Global South beyond territorial borders can help rebalance this asymmetry of power by 
locating Global Southern power within the geographic North. 
Advocacy to bolster anticipatory responses to climate displacement remains 
particularly important given the significant normative counterweight of nation-state 
sovereignty. The literature has increasingly shifted away from proposing remedial 
protective measures, such as the application of international refugee law and 
complementary protection, towards promoting ex ante approaches that allow people to 
move before disaster occurs.122 Climate displacement scholar Jane McAdam argues that 
legal, policy, and technical interventions such as disaster risk reduction, mitigation and 
adaptation, and migration pathways all contribute to how long people can stay in 
countries of origin and the extent to which migration becomes an experience of dignity 
rather than increased exposure to risk.123 Legal scholar Katrina Wyman recommends 
increasing immigration quotas in developed countries.124 The Nansen Initiative, now the 
Platform on Disaster Displacement, lays out a number of policy measures that pave the 
way for people to move in advance of harm.125 
The international community has endorsed the anticipatory approach as the favored 
response to climate displacement by ratifying the Global Compact.126 Signed by more 
than 160 countries,127 the Global Compact recommends that national governments 
implement anticipatory measures in response to climate displacement, including 
humanitarian visas, private sponsorships, and work permits,128 in order to ensure that 
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migration becomes an experience of dignity rather than despair.129 The Global Compact, 
like other legal instruments that propose an anticipatory approach, carefully affirms the 
sovereign right of nation-states to determine admission into their territory.130 Yet, given 
that sovereignty—constituted by the right to exclude—is the defining doctrine of 
international law, counterhegemonic resistance will be crucial to ensuring that 
nation-states choose admission policies that favor Global Southerners.131 
Precedent in the literature on international law and social movements, especially in 
relation to environmental matters, supports the potential of private actors to influence 
international law through organizing.132 Geographic South social movements with 
support from the geographic North, including environmental movements, catalyzed the 
expansion of international institutions from the late 1960s onwards, thus playing a central 
role in the evolution of international law.133 Bretton Woods Institutions, in particular, 
turned to address the environment, poverty, and equity because of a “complex and 
ambivalent alliance with and in opposition to” popular movements in the geographic 
South.134 For example, the World Bank integrated the environment into its central affairs 
as a result of a transnational grassroots resistance in the 1980s.135 The protests in Seattle 
against the World Trade Organization in 1999 also foreground the impact social 
movements can have on international law.136 
Despite the statist stance, international law, defined by evolving norms and 
standards, is by its nature participatory.137 As such, it becomes possible for social 
movements to shape the contents of international law, including human rights, so that 
“the content[s] of rights are to be found in the dynamic interplay between social 
movement praxis and the legal formulations of international lawyers and 
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policy-makers.”138 In the climate displacement realm, this co-optation of rights discourse 
by Global Southerners would be particularly appropriate given that the predominant 
approach to climate displacement stems from human rights law.139 Yet shaping 
international law would be useful for other Global Southern social movements, “for 
whom the struggle against globalization is the struggle to live.”140 
Certainly, the predominant approach to the law, with its commitment to both source 
and method, prevents a clear view of the role social movements play in shaping legal 
discourse. For example, environmental scholarship typically privileges the regulatory 
behavior of the state over the rise of the environmental movement in recounting the 
development of environmental law.141 Yet this focus has the effect of erasing the social 
origins of the law and therefore the role that organized people play in shaping legal 
discourse.142 Furthermore, legal analysis typically focuses on the textual confines of the 
language of the law, again obscuring a social movement lens.143 
A substantial body of social movement literature pushes back against this 
predominant approach, allowing for the importance of extra-institutional forms of 
mobilization and private actors in shaping legal discourse. Critical race theory, feminist, 
and LGBTQ+ scholarship posit that organized ordinary people can be agents of legal 
transformation.144 Within international law, incorporating a social movement lens allows 
for an emphatic shift of focus to those whose voice the legal system discredits and 
highlights the need to reformulate the law to account for their interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Although TWAIL scholarship’s aim to analyze questions of power within 
international law is a central one, the literature’s primary mode of analysis—that is, a 
Westphalian-framed North-South divide—needs revision. This Essay argues that global 
capitalism renders racialized humans in both the geographic North and South 
expendable. As such, there are Global Southerners in the North and Global Northerners 
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in the South. It is therefore no longer appropriate to analyze the power imbalances that 
international law shapes solely in terms of inequality between nation-states. Instead, this 
Essay proposes that people and spaces across the North-South divide share common 
negative experiences under global capitalism. This claim allows the Essay to argue that 
Global Southerners in the North serve as a heretofore unnamed site of resistance in 
international law. Their hybrid positionality offers useful potential for overcoming 
intransigent issues across the North-South divide. This Essay therefore offers a new 
perspective to the central debate in the literature over international law’s disadvantaging 
of Global Southerners. 
